Environment, Energy and War

An article on the effects of war in Ukraine written early in the conflict opens with the statement that the “first and most serious tragedy of any armed conflict is its direct effects: every war brings with it a heavy burden of civilian and military casualties from warfare” (Dumčiūtė and Tecleme, 2022). The authors refer also to indirect victims such as refugees, the impoverished, and those who suffer malnutrition and loss of work and education, but they note as well that there are environmental consequences which may in time cause more deaths than the war itself. These effects and some other possible future developments are explored in the papers cited below.

Khan (2022) discusses the war in Ukraine in the context of other post WWII conflicts, such as the bombing of Kosovo, the conflicts in Afghanistan, the Iraq-Iran War, the Gulf Wars, the Yemeni civil war and the war in Syria. She refers to the use of Agent Orange and other toxic chemicals by US forces in Vietnam and claims that the scientific study which examined the resulting environmental damage, together with the multi-disciplinary study on the impacts of the 1991 Gulf War are the only comprehensive studies of the environmental impacts of conflicts in the second half of the twentieth century. Statistics on some aspects of military activity are nevertheless available, and Khan quotes a figure on greenhouse gases: “Between 2001 and 2017, it is estimated that the U.S. military emitted more than 400 million metric tons of greenhouse gases from war-related fuel consumption, including the major war zones of Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. The largest portion of Pentagon fuel consumption is for military jets.” She also cites conflict debris in Mosul after the war with ISIL, estimated at 11 million tonnes. However, most topics are necessarily discussed mainly in qualitative terms: they include biodiversity loss, soil erosion, terrain compaction, damage to ecosystems, forest fires caused by bombardment, introduction of invasive species, species extinction and habitat degradation, damage to irrigation systems and the loss of viable farming land.

Gardashuk (2022) writing on the conflict in Ukraine from the viewpoint of Kyiv also lists some of the environmental damages, noting that the list is necessarily incomplete and will grow with time. She writes of “large-scale, complex, and long-lasting environmental threats, risks, and catastrophes that result in the degradation of both the natural and human environment.” War disrupts natural systems both locally and globally, due to the emission of harmful substances from military machines and weapon systems and the targeting of industrial objects, with particular danger in the case of nuclear facilities. Beside these effects, the displacement of populations from agricultural land threatens food security both in the short and longer terms. Gardashuk places the damage in the context of international law prohibiting those means of warfare which may cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment citing Article 35 of the Geneva Conventions.

Koban and Pfluger (2022) consider the release during conflict of a particular class of contaminant, the PFAS (per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances) which are used as binders in some types of explosives and components of munitions. They are chemically stable and resist degradation in most conditions, allowing them to be mobile in soil, air, and water, and to accumulate in living organisms. Inhalation and ingestion by humans can lead to health damage. “PFAS can remain in an environment long after armed conflict” so that the “toxic contamination from munitions could present a greater hazard to a larger population over time than acute detonation events.” The authors cite examples of the half-lives of two substances in this group as 41 and 92 years and note that “soil in France and Germany is still contaminated by WWII munitions” with substantial quantities of unexploded munitions being found each year. They stress the need to attempt to quantify the amount of toxins released during conflict in order to anticipate future health impacts and discuss methods of estimation. One approach that could provide a rough guide is that of combining satellite imagery with the available reports concerning the types of military unit involved and the intensity of fighting.

Montesclaros and Sembiring (2022) address the impacts of the war in Ukraine on global food security, noting that in conflict settings “both food availability and accessibility are hampered, since farmers are driven away from fields/farms, agricultural assets and food stock are damaged, and logistics and supply chains are disrupted.” They place the war’s impact on food security in the context of broader trends, citing the FAO’s State of Food Insecurity in the World Report (2017) which claimed that global undernourishment increased from 777 million people in 2015 to 815 million in 2016, and the United Nations Global Crisis Response Group’s projection that ninety-four countries will be impacted by either food, energy, or finance concerns due to the war in Ukraine. The situation has been aggravated by a “phase of higher energy and food prices” resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, and by what the FAO described as the “slow yet steady negative impacts of climate stresses on food production internationally, including extreme heat, drought, floods, and storms.”

Lanoszka, Rogers and Triglavcanin (2022) consider the EU’s reliance on energy imports from Russia, to which it has paid approximately €1 trillion in the past ten years. In order to achieve decarbonisation and greater control over energy supplies, the EU will need additional energy partners, and Ukraine is seen as having considerable potential to become one of them. It has abundant wind and solar resources and the equivalent of 27% of the EU’s gas storage capacity, but a number of reforms would be necessary for a partnership, and the authors go on to describe them.

The difficulties are considerable: much Ukrainian infrastructure has been destroyed, great amounts of fuel have been burned and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant has been captured by Russia. The long view could however be favourable to energy partnership with the EU. In addition to wind and solar energy, there is potential for biomass and waste management, which with investment could produce a renewable energy output of 21.4 terawatt hours by 2030. Improved electricity connectivity between the EU and Ukraine would be needed to take advantage of this potential, as would implementation of the EU’s hydrogen strategy. Ukraine also has major gas reserves, more than five times larger than those of the UK, and considerable gas storage capacity. Storage for hydrogen produced using renewable energy is expected to become increasingly important in order to achieve greater energy security. Ukraine “has a green agenda that complements that of the EU”, with peacetime targets of carbon-neutrality by 2060 and plans for a national greenhouse gas emissions trading system and carbon taxes. While difficult adjustments to Ukraine’s regulatory and policy frameworks might be needed for energy partnership, “the long-term benefit for energy security is significant for the EU and Ukraine alike”.

Steffen and Patt (2022) ask whether the invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces could be a turning point for energy policy in Europe. The goal of achieving net-zero energy systems will require the phase-out of fossil energy together with sustained investment in alternatives over decades, and the policymakers who must act in order to bring about change pay attention to public support. Since “shocks and crises are important drivers of political processes” the authors examine “how the war has changed public policy support” for the transition to net-zero energy. Evidence from a population survey in Switzerland showed “strong support for clean energy policies across much of the political spectrum” and is believed to be fairly representative of wider European opinion, so that it could indicate “a window of opportunity for new climate and energy policies in Europe.” Survey results showed resistance to the installation of new gas-fired power stations, and strong though qualified support for banning fossil fuel heating systems. Continuation of support for clean energy policies cannot be taken for granted, should not be regarded as predictive of future attitudes, and may depend on the way in which policy develops. Alongside renewable energy development within Europe, important policy measures could include “constructing liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals to access natural gas from Qatar or the United States, measures to reduce reliance across the economy on imports from non-democratic countries, including China, and tax reductions for fossil fuels.”

The authors comment that following the “dreadful human suffering and massive economic damage in Ukraine” it is hard to imagine that “the political and economic relations between Russia and the West will recover in the foreseeable future”; economic recession in Europe remains a possibility and could produce policy changes harmful to progress towards net zero energy.

 

References

 

Dumčiūtė, A., and Tecleme, L., 2022, Ukraine and the others: the environmental impacts of war, Europa, online, accessed 27 Sept. 2022

https://youth.europa.eu/year-of-youth/young-journalists/ukraine-and-others-environmental-impacts-of-war_en

Gardashuk, T., 2022, Environmental Threats of War in Ukraine, Envigogika, online, accessed 22 Sept. 2022  

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/359773234_Environmental_Threats_of_War_in_Ukraine

Khan, M., 2022, The Environmental Impacts of War and Conflict, Political Science, online, accessed 22 Sept. 2022 

https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Environmental-Impacts-of-War-and-Conflict-Khan/2a7aff530596452924740b0189488e9e6d4693cd

Koban, L., and Pfluger, A., 2022, Per‐and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) Exposure Through Munitions in Russia‐Ukraine Conflict, Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management, online, accessed 28 Sept. 2022

https://setac.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/ieam.4672

Lanoszka, A., Rogers, J., Triglavcanin, P., 2022,  A new energy policy for Europe: The significance of Ukraine, Council on Geostrategy, online, accessed 28 Sept. 2022 

https://www.geostrategy.org.uk/app/uploads/2022/06/GPR01-08062022.pdf

Montesclaros, J., and Sembiring, M., 2022, Food Insecurity Beyond Borders: Untangling the Complex Impacts of Ukraine War on Global Food Security, NTS, online, accessed 28 Sept. 2022 

https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/NTS-Insight-IN-22-03-Food-Insecurity-Beyond-Borders-Aug2022.pdf

Steffen, B. and Patt, A., 2022,  A historical turning point? Early evidence on how the Russia-Ukraine war changes public support for clean energy policies, Energy Research & Social Science, online, accessed via Google Scholar 28 Sept. 2022. Science direct:   

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629622002614

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